SCC File No. 37770

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ALBERTA)

BETWEEN:

MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
And ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

APPELLANT
(Respondent)

- and -

Tusif Ur Rehman CHHINA

RESPONDENT
(Appellant)

- and -

END IMMIGRATION DETENTION NETWORK; CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF REFUGEE LAWYERS; DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL – CANADA; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CANADA; COMMUNITY & LEGAL AID SERVICES PROGRAMME; CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES; QUEEN'S PRISON LAW CLINIC; EGALE CANADA HUMAN RIGHTS TRUST; BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION; CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION; CANADIAN PRISON LAW ASSOCIATION

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FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER – CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES

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PART I - OVERVIEW

1. The physical and psychological harms of detention can be significant in the immigration context, particularly for children, trafficked persons, individuals suffering from mental health issues, and refugee claimants, who suffer from enhanced vulnerability due to prior exposure to trauma and loss.[1] Because of the fundamental right to liberty[2] and the potentially devastating impact of detention, it is imperative that immigration detainees have access to the remedy of *habeas corpus* – particularly in the context of maladministration of the detention review regime, which has been recently highlighted by the Federal Court ("FC"), superior courts, and an external auditor commissioned by the Immigration and Refugee Board ("IRB").[3]

2. Without access to *habeas corpus*, immigration detainees are limited to seeking judicial review before the FC, a process that, because of its inherent limitations, is unable to adequately address issues of maladministration and unlawful detention under the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*.[4] *Habeas corpus* is required to protect all individuals, including those detained under IRPA, against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.[5]

PART II - QUESTION AT ISSUE

3. *Habeas corpus* should remain available to all detainees who raise a legitimate ground upon which to question the legality of their detention, given the limitations of the judicial review process in Federal Court.

PART III - ARGUMENT

4. The CCR agrees with the Respondent that in light of the entrenchment of *habeas corpus* in s. 10(c) of the *Charter,* where the lawfulness of detention is challenged and not the validity of a removal order or status decision under immigration legislation, it does not matter whether there

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[1] Janet Cleveland & Cécile Rousseau, "Psychiatric Symptoms Associated with Brief Detention of Adult Asylum Seekers in Canada" (2013) 58:7 The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 410; Rachel Kronick et al., "Mandatory detention of refugee children: A public health issue?" (2011) 16:8 Paediatrics & Child Health 292; *Henry v British Columbia*, 2016 BCSC 1038 at paras 237-238, 364, 374, 423 , 424 and 441.

[2] *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,* Part I of the Constitution 1-151 Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 at ss. 7, 9 and 10(c).

[3] See e.g. *Brown v Canada (MCI),* 2017 FC 710 [*Brown*], *Scotland v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2017 ONSC 4850 [*Scotland*]; *Ali v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2017 ONSC 2660 [*Ali*], *R v Ogiamien*, 2016 ONSC 4126 [*Ogiamien ONSC*]; Immigration and Refugee Board, "Report of the 2017/2018 External Audit (Detention Review)" (July 20, 2018) [IRB Audit].

[4] SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].

[5] *May v Ferndale Institution*, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3 SCR 809 at para 39 [*May v Ferndale*].

is a complete, comprehensive and expert statutory scheme that also provides for a review of the liberty infringement. *Habeas corpus* should remain available to all detainees seeking to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, including those who are detained under the IRPA.

5. However, it is the CCR's submission that the IRPA detention review scheme does not constitute a "complete, comprehensive and expert statutory scheme that provides for review at least as broad as *habeas corpus* and no less advantageous"[6] given issues of maladministration which the Federal Court is unable to adequately correct. Superior courts must therefore maintain concurrent jurisdiction to review the legality of all decisions to detain individuals under the IRPA.

a. Maladministration by the Immigration Division

6. The immigration detention review regime has suffered from maladministration by the Immigration Division ("ID") in recent years. The IRB itself has acknowledged this in its response to an independent audit of long-term detention reviews commissioned by the former Chairperson.[7] Superior courts reviewing the legality of individual instances of immigration detention on *habeas corpus* have also highlighted the problem,[8] as has the Federal Court on review of the constitutionality of the immigration detention regime.[9]

i. IRB audit

7. In September 2017, the IRB commissioned an independent audit to assess detention review hearings and decisions in randomly selected cases where detention exceeded 100 days, with a focus on fairness of process and compliance with the *Charter*.[10]

8. The Appellant has objected to the admissibility of the audit as new evidence. However, the audit and the IRB MRAP response are also admissible as "articles and text" in light of the this Court's practice of considering articles and texts outlining the social and practical context of

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[6] *Ibid*.
[7] IRB Audit, *supra* note 3. See also Immigration and Refugee Board, "IRB's Management Response and Action Plan – Detention Review under the IRPA", July 20, 2018 [IRB MRAP].
[8] *Scotland, Ali, Ogiamien ONSC*, *supra* note 2; *Ogiamien v Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services),* 2017 ONCA 839 at para 41.
[9] *Brown, supra* note 3.
[10] IRB Audit, *supra* note 3; IRB MRAP, *supra* note 7.

issues that come before it.[11] Whether the audit is accepted as evidence or not, the findings are illustrative of the types of problems that can arise in the administration of the IRPA detention review scheme.[12] Such examples are highly pertinent as this Court seeks to provide guidance on the availability of *habeas corpus* to immigration detainees.

9. The audit found evidence of widespread and systemic maladministration of Canada's immigration detention regime, including:

a. **Unfairness in evidentiary standards**: The ID relied uncritically on statements by CBSA hearings officers, failed to allow detained persons to hear and present evidence, failed to independently assess credibility or critically examine factual circumstances, failed to require sworn evidence from enforcement officers where details about ongoing investigations were unclear, and failed to question CBSA on delay issues.[13]

b. **Issues with substantive decision making**: The ID's factual findings contained inaccuracies, inconsistencies and speculation. False narratives based on negative assumptions unsupported by evidence or inaccurate statements by CBSA officers gradually became part of the accepted history for detainees. Issues identified in prior decisions were not resolved because decisions were not uniformly transcribed and available.[14] Statutory and regulatory factors were rigidly

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[11] Published articles fall within the scope of "articles and texts" permitted in books of authorities under s. 2 of the *Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada*, SOR/2002-156; see also: *Goodwin v B.C.,* 2015 SCC 46 at para 86 and *R. v Spence*, [2005] 3 SCR 458 at paras 30-42; 48-49; 53-69.

[12] See *R v Appulonappa*, [2015] 3 SCR 754 at para 28.

[13] IRB Audit, *supra* note 3 at 7, 13-17. The IRB Audit refers to similar criticisms made by the Ontario Superior Court in *Brown, supra* note 3, at paras 71-75 and *Ali, supra* note 3 at para 23. It also observed the practice in one region of denying a proposed bondsperson the opportunity to testify. CBSA noted the witness's evidence in private and summarized it to the ID, thereby controlling the inflow of information. The Member denied themselves and the detained the opportunity to hear the evidence and ask questions.

[14] IRB Audit, *supra* note 3 at 12-13, 20, also referencing *Ogiamen ONSC, supra* note 3 at para 91; *Scotland, supra* note 3 at paras 15-19, 26 and 31; *Ali, supra* note 3 at para 32; and *Wang,* 2015 FC 79, at paras 28 and 30. For e.g., the ID referenced a firearm conviction that did not exist, stated a person forfeited "thousands of dollars" in posted bonds, which never occurred, and added 'danger' as a detention ground on the mistaken assumption it had previously been argued.

interpreted, limiting the scope of the review and failing to account for the circumstances of the individual case.[15]

c. **Failure to decide afresh and over-reliance on previous decisions**: The serial nature of reviews, the role of the reviewing member, and deference paid to earlier decisions led to ID decisions becoming cumulative, without a fresh review of the legality of the detention, over months and even years. The decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in *Thanabalasingham* was often cited as restricting the ID's discretion to change course without "clear and compelling reasons,"[16] which effectively shifted the onus of proof to the detained person.[17]

d. **Barriers to participation of the detained person in the hearing and fairness issues**: Detained persons were often unrepresented by counsel,[18] and had to rely on their memory of previous hearings. Inaccessible language and late complex disclosure caused barriers. Detainees' statements were not treated as evidence and they were not given the opportunity to give affirmed evidence. As a result, they often stopped participating in hearings and sometimes stopped attending altogether. Hearings would become shorter and shorter; many hearings were completed in less than five minutes.[19]

e. **Barriers for detained persons with mental health issues**: One detainee suffered a complete mental collapse after 16 months in detention. He stopped talking and became unresponsive to any interaction for the next 3 years. He stopped attending hearings, but was described at hearings as "immobile," and was eventually diagnosed as catatonic. ID decisions repeatedly cited his mental health as demonstrating that he would be a danger to the public and a flight

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[15] IRB Audit, *supra* note 3 at 17, 26-30.

[16] See *Canada (MCI) v Thanabalasingham,* [2004] 3 FC 572, 2004 FCA 4 [*Thanabalasingham*].

[17] IRB Audit, *supra* note 3 at 6, 11-12, 20-23, and 26, also referencing similar findings made in *Chhina v Canada*, 2017 ABCA 248 at para 43; *Chaudhary v Canada (MPSEP)*, 2015 ONCA 700 at paras 88-89; and *Scotland*, *supra* note 3 at para 73: "at every subsequent detention review, it is difficult, if not impossible, to displace the initial decision. Each ID decision, even if later proven to have been based on faulty information, gets relied on and replicated the next time around." The Audit observed in *Ali, supra* note 3, that over 7 years, in 90 detention reviews that took place and only one Member in one decision showed a fresh and independent assessment of the evidence.

[18] IRB Audit, *supra* note 3 at 37: in 2017 rates of representation by counsel at ID hearings averaged 76% in Eastern Region; 70% in Western Region; and 38% in Central Region.

[19] *Ibid* at 2, 9, 17-18, 23-24.

risk if released. Members noted that he was "obstructing the removal process in a very extreme way"; "not willing to attend"; and "is refusing to cooperate." For almost two years after his mental collapse, CBSA submissions and ID decisions barely acknowledged his mental health issues. CBSA described him on one occasion as "mumbling incoherently." And on another as engaging in a "passive protest". Many decisions appeared to rely on stereotypes about people with mental illness, even in the face of testimony from his social worker and submissions from his designated representative as to his profound limitations.[20]

f. **A lack of active adjudication in considering alternatives to detention:** Members in Central Region always accepted release proposals with Toronto Bail Program ("TBP") support, and rejected plans proposed by alternative service providers. The TBP is funded by CBSA, which means that an adversarial party to the process, CBSA, had a non-arm's length relationship with an agency on which the ID conferred a gatekeeper-like role in respect of release.[21]

ii. Findings of the superior courts

10. Superior courts on *habeas corpus* have repeatedly identified flaws in the ID decision-making process that mirror the systemic problems highlighted in the IRB audit.[22]

11. Most pointedly, in *Scotland v Canada* the Ontario Superior Court ("OSC") identified significant issues throughout Mr. Scotland's monthly detention reviews, concluding that he "appears enmeshed in an endless circuit of mistakes, unproven accusations, and technicalities."[23] The OSC found the ID's improper reliance on the CBSA undermined its independent decision-making authority and made it nearly impossible for the detainee to have his deprivation of liberty reviewed fairly and in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.[24]

12. The OSC also observed that the ID and CBSA read culpability into, and assigned fault to,

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[20] *Ibid* at 19, 24-25, 39-40.

[21] *Ibid* at 7, 19-22, also noting that "the danger of the ID ceding any aspect of its decision-making authority to CBSA, and failing to maintain a fully independent adjudicative role, has been remarked upon by the Ontario Superior Court [in *Scotland*, *supra* note 3 at paras 60-63]."

[22] See *Scotland, supra* note 3; *Ali, supra* note 3; and *Ogiamien ONSC, supra* note 3.

[23] *Scotland, supra* note 3 at para 2.

[24] *Ibid* at para 61. A similar issue arose in *Ogiamien ONSC, supra* note 3 at paras 59, 80-81, and 92: The ID accepted CBSA's allegation that the detainee breached by failing to report, but never considered the reason - that he was in pre-trial custody on charges later withdrawn. There was also no evidence provided by CBSA about removal efforts, prospects, timelines or the position of Nigerian officials on the applicant's status, apart from CBSA's own words.

inadvertent and innocuous actions on the part of the applicant, such as a failure to notify CBSA of a change of address when the applicant was taken into pre-trial custody, even though he called to advise CBSA of his arrest; an inadvertent failure to report on a holiday; and a breach of bail conditions which had actually been varied so did not constitute a breach. The OSC observed that as a result, the ID continued detention on what amounted to imprisonment on an absolute liability basis, contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.[25]

13. In *Ali v Canada,* the OSC characterized the applicant's situation as "the immigration equivalent of the Gordian Knot, that is, an extremely difficult and apparently unsolvable problem."[26] The OSC observed that the applicant's detention of more than seven years must be seen as exceptional, and "could literally continue forever."[27] It found the assertion that the applicant was actively preventing CBSA from confirming his country of citizenship to be "nothing more than skepticism and speculation," and concluded his detention was no longer reasonably connected to the immigration purpose for which it was originally ordered.[28]

iii. Observations by the Federal Court

14. In *Brown v Canada,* the FC determined that the IRPA detention review scheme was constitutionally sound.[29] While the CCR does not concede the constitutionality of the scheme, it is important that in making this determination, the FC recognized that the detention review process might suffer from "shortcomings" or "maladministration."[30] The FC also noted that in some cases, detention may be unhinged from its immigration-related purposes and continue based on a misapplication of the law.[31]

15. The issues highlighted by the FC include failures on the part of the ID to decide afresh at

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[25] *Scotland, supra* note 3 at paras 9, 10, 64-65, 73; *Ogiamien ONSC*, *supra* note 3 at para 59.
[26] *Ali, supra* note 3 at para 1.
[27] *Ibid* at para 20.
[28] *Ibid* at paras 1, 20, 32. See also *Ogiamien ONSC, supra* note 3 at paras 59, 62-69, 77-85: the applicant was said not to be cooperating with CBSA investigations, but evidence of his cooperation was ignored and CBSA's own failure to investigate his case for 8 years before he was arrested was not considered. The Court found his detention had no end in sight.
[29] *Brown*, *supra* note 3 at para 5, 120 and 127.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid* at paras 5, 120.

each detention review whether continued detention was warranted;[32] reliance by the ID on hearsay instead of requiring evidence of contested factual allegations; and incomplete and/or late pre-hearing disclosure, which precluded the opportunity to effectively respond.[33]

16. Regardless of whether these particular issues are adequately addressed as a result of ongoing litigation, maladministration is inevitable in a system as complex as the immigration detention regime, and individuals whose detention becomes unlawful as a result of that maladministration will always need access to an adequate remedy. As a result of the limitations of the process of the stay and judicial review, the FC is unable to address these issues in the way that a superior court can in the context of *habeas corpus*.

b. Limitations of Federal Court review

17. Judicial review by the Federal Court cannot adequately address the issues highlighted in the preceding section due to the limited scope of review, its inherently discretionary nature, and the ineffective nature of the remedy available.

i. Scope of review

18. The Appellant contends that *habeas corpus* and FC review are substantively similar given that they are both conducted on a reasonableness standard. This is misleading. While the standards of review may be similar in both contexts, there is a key difference: the scope of review. While the FC assesses the reasonableness of the decision at issue, the superior court on *habeas corpus* assesses the reasonableness ***of the detention***.[34]

19. A *habeas corpus* application is not a review of any particular decision, but rather a review of the legality of the detention overall. A superior court hearing such an application can therefore

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[32] The FC in *Thanabalasingham, supra* note 16 noted that, in reviewing the reasons for continued detention, the ID must decide afresh at each hearing whether continued detention is warranted.

[33] *Brown*, *supra* note 3 at paras 120-127.

[34] For e.g., in *Canada v Lunyamila*, 2016 FC 1199 the Federal Court set aside five consecutive release orders and remitted them to the ID, without considering the lawfulness of detention itself; In *Canada (MCI) v B031*, 2011 FC 878 at paras 1-9, 17-18: After the ground for detention of 61 individuals changed, the Federal Court declined to consider further issues affecting ongoing detention, noting that while the Minister may seek continued detention on other grounds, "Any decision on my part with respect to the meaning of s. 248 of the *Regulations* would not be helpful, in any of the remaining 61 cases where identity is no longer at issue...".

consider the full scope of the legality of detention, from the moment of arrest to the moment of the hearing.

20. Moreover, given the Federal Court of Appeal's decision in *Thanabalasingham,* the FC often restricts itself to considering whether the ID's assessment of clear and compelling reasons to depart from the previous decision is reasonable.[35] The application of this standard may effectively insulate prior decisions from review by the FC, and prevent the Court from assessing the legality of the underlying reasons for detention.

21. Further, on *habeas corpus* the superior court convenes a hearing and hears evidence, whereas the FC is restricted to a paper-based assessment of the evidentiary record before it. The superior court is therefore able to test the evidence, unlike the FC. There is also no restriction on new evidence in a *habeas corpus* application, whereas the FC cannot consider new evidence except in very exceptional circumstances.[36]

ii. The inherently discretionary nature of judicial review

22. Judicial review is inherently discretionary[37] – in terms of access, timeline and remedy.

23. The 30-day cycle of detention review hearings before the ID means that if a detainee files an application for leave and judicial review of an ID decision, that decision will necessarily be overtaken by subsequent decisions by the time leave is granted and a judicial review hearing occurs according to the regular timelines (if leave is granted). Where that occurs, the decision at issue becomes moot, and the detainee is subject to the FC's discretion to have the matter heard.[38]

24. The Appellant suggests that the FC's power to grant leave and schedule a judicial review hearing on an expedited basis supports the proposition that judicial review is just as expeditious as a *habeas corpus* application. This is inconsistent with the FC's statement in *Canada v B386* that "[t]he 30-day delay between detention reviews renders impracticable, even with the best of intentions of all concerned, to have an application for leave and for judicial review of a detention review decision heard and decided before the conduct of another detention review."[39]

25. In any case, access to an expedited judicial review hearing is discretionary and need not be granted, whereas *habeas corpus* is an inherently expeditious process that is available in a

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[35] *Thanabalasingham, supra* note 18.
[36] *Chopra v Canada (Treasury Board)*, 1999 CanLII 8044.
[37] *Mission Institution v Khela*, [2014] 1 SCR 502, 2014 SCC 24 [*Khela*] at para 41.
[38] See for e.g. *Canada (MCI) v B386*, 2011 FC 175 [B386]; *Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Lunyamila*, 2018 FC 211.
[39] B386, *ibid* at para 13.

timely manner as of right.[40]

26. As a result, a detainee is inevitably subject to the FC's discretion when pursuing review of an ID decision. *Habeas corpus*, on the other hand, is heard as of right where the applicant proves a deprivation of liberty and a legitimate ground to challenge the legality of the deprivation (in that the Court has no discretion to **not** hear the application).[41]

27. Even where the FC finds that the decision at hand is unreasonable, the issuance of a remedy is also discretionary.[42] On a *habeas corpus* application, on the other hand, where the Superior Court finds detention has become unlawful, a remedy of release is issued as of right.

iii. The inadequacy of relief on judicial review/lack of interim relief

28. The powers of the FC on judicial review are limited to setting aside the decision at issue and referring it back for determination "with such directions as it considers to be appropriate,"[43] a remedy that is woefully inadequate in the detention context. Even when faced with unlawful detention, the FC has no power to order release.[44]

29. In this respect, the difference between judicial review and a *habeas corpus* application is stark. If an instance of maladministration has occurred in respect of the detention of a particular

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[40] *Federal Courts Rules*, SOR/98-106 at Rule 8(1): "[o]n motion, the Court may extend or abridge a period provided by these Rules or fixed by an order." [emphasis added]

[41] *Ogiamien ONSC, supra* note 3 at para 41; *May v Ferndale, supra* note 5 at paras 33-34. See also e.g. *Supreme Court Civil Rules*, BC Reg 168/2009 at 8-1(5); Ontario *Rules of Civil Procedure*, RRO 1990, Reg 194 at rule 38.03; *Khela, supra* note 37 at para 41.

[42] See *Federal Courts Act*, RSC, 1985, c F-7 at ss. 18.1(3) and (4), both of which use the permissive language of "may."

[43] *Ibid* at s 18.1(3)(b).

[44] The only instance of the Federal Court ordering release is an interlocutory order in *Calin v Canada (MCI),* 2018 FC 731, a highly unusual exercise of the Court's jurisdiction on interim proceedings. The detainee's removal had already been scheduled when she was released, and was to take place before the judicial review hearing of the 7-day decision to continue her detention. It is therefore unclear what would have occurred if the Federal Court had upheld or overturned the detention decision on judicial review. It is also unclear whether the Federal Court in fact has powers of release on a motion for interim relief. This is in contrast to the interim relief available to the Minister before the Federal Court to obtain a stay of a release order where it can identify a "serious issue", "irreparable harm" and a "balance of convenience" (see e.g. *Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v B479,* 2010 FC 1227; *Canada (MPSEP) v Lunyamila*, 2016 FC 60).

individual, thereby rendering that detention unreasonable, the FC sitting in review can only remit the decision back for determination before the Immigration Division.[45] In the context of systemic problems of maladministration, returning a detainee to face a new decision before the same body might provide little relief. While the FC might have a role to play in addressing systemic issues of maladministration, such remedies are of limited use to a detainee caught within the detention regime as it currently exists. On *habeas corpus*, on the other hand, an unreasonable detention is an unlawful one,[46] and the remedy issued as of right is release.[47]

c. Conclusion

30. *Habeas corpus* is a "cornerstone of liberty" and must be available to all detainees, including individuals who are detained under IRPA. Maladministration and the limitations of judicial review reveal that, absent this great writ, detainees are left without access to "a means of judicial control over the arbitrary behavior of the executive government."[48]

PART IV - COSTS

31. The CCR seeks no costs and respectfully requests that none be awarded against it.

PART V - ORDER REQUESTED

32. The CCR takes no position on the disposition of the appeal.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Vancouver, British Columbia on this 30th day of October, 2018

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Erica Olmstead
Molly Joeck
Peter Edelmann
Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian Council for Refugees

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[45] See for e.g. *Ali v Canada (MCI)*, [2015] FC 1012 at para 18, where the Federal Court rejected the applicant's request for a directed verdict after it allowed the judicial review: "It is not the role of this Court to substitute its own view of a preferred outcome or to reweigh the evidence."

[46] *Khela, supra* note 37 at paras 3 and 74.

[47] Note also that superior courts have further powers that the Federal Court does not. See for e.g. *Ogiamien ONSC*, *supra* note 3 at para 73, where the OSC appointed an amicus, and ordered Mr. Ogiamien be given access to his file and copies of relevant case law, among other things.

[48] *Chaudhary, supra* note 17 at para 38.

PART VI -TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

LEGISLATION	CITED AT PARAGRAPH(S)
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 1-151 Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the *Canada Act* 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 at ss. 7 EN/FR, 9 EN/FR, and 10(c) EN/FR.	1, 4, 7
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Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, Rule 38.03 EN/FR	26
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CASES	CITED AT PARAGRAPH(S)
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Wang v Canada (MPSEP), 2015 FC 79	9

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J. Cleveland & C. Rousseau, "Psychiatric Symptoms Associated with Brief Detention of Adult Asylum Seekers in Canada" (2013) 58:7 The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 409	1
Rachel Kronick et al., "Mandatory detention of refugee children: A public health issue?" (2011) 16:8 Paediatrics & Child Health 292	1
Immigration and Refugee Board, "Report of the 2017/2018 External Audit (Detention Review)" (July 20, 2018).	1, 6, 7, 8, 9