Case information

Labour Relations — Grievances — Public Service Employees — Action against employer and fellow employees for alleged torts of intentional infliction of mental suffering, assault and battery, and for alleged breaches of employee’s rights — Court finding plain and obvious employee’s claim would fail for want of jurisdiction, given federal public service statutory framework — Whether lower courts erred in interpreting statutory framework to impose a bar to court actions for civil damages by federal public sector employees even if involving intentional torts by fellow employees? — What is the proper test for courts to apply to determine if the statutory framework bars an intentional tort claim? — Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2, ss. 208 and 236.

Case summaries are prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). Please note that summaries are not provided to the Judges of the Court. They are placed on the Court file and website for information purposes only.

Mr. Ebadi was employed with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and had been on sick leave because of an alleged pattern of discrimination, humiliation, harassment and psychological abuse in the workplace. He commenced an action against his employer and some CSIS employees alleging intentional torts of mental suffering, assault and battery, as well as breaches of his rights under ss. 2, 7, and 15 of the Charter.

The Federal Court struck the action, holding that it was plain and obvious that the claim would fail for want of jurisdiction, as it was barred by the combined operation of ss. 208 and 236 of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act (FPSLRA). Together, these provisions bar any civil recourse for “any dispute relating to… terms or conditions of employment” that can be addressed through a grievance procedure.

The Federal Court of Appeal majority dismissed the appeal, holding that the Federal Court correctly understood and applied para. 208(1)(b) and s. 236 of the FPSLRA, and did not err in refusing to exercise its residual discretion to allow the claim to proceed. The dissenting judge disagreed with the majority’s interpretation and stated it was not plain and obvious that s. 236(1) would bar the claim.