Case information

Torts — Motor vehicles — Negligence — Civil liability of owner — Vicarious liability —Legislation — Interpretation — Whether a statutory deemed agent of an owner can confer, in that capacity, the owner’s consent to a third party’s driving or whether s. 86 of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 318, was intended to limit the formation of a secondary relationship of agency, as the Court of Appeal held? — What conduct amounts to “driving or operating” a vehicle under s. 86? — Is there an unwritten physical element to “operation”, as the Court of Appeal held? — Is there also an unwritten requirement that the time of the “operation” coincide with the time of the accident? — Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 318, s. 86(1).

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The applicant, Tyson Bowe (“Tyson”), suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident that was the consequence of a joyride that he embarked on with his cousin, the respondent Dale Bowe (“Dale”), when they were both 15 years old. At the time of the accident, Tyson was living with his stepfather, the respondent Roy Boltz, who owned the vehicle. Tyson took the keys without Mr. Boltz’s knowledge. Also at the time of the accident, Dale was driving and Tyson was a front seat passenger. A jury allowed Tyson’s claim in negligence against Dale, who was found 60 percent at fault for Tyson’s injuries, but dismissed a negligence claim against Mr. Boltz. Tyson’s further claim that Mr. Boltz was vicariously liable for Dale’s negligence under s. 86(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 318 (“MVA”), was successful following a decision on the interpretation of that provision rendered by a judge in the Supreme Court of British Columbia.

The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed Mr. Boltz’s cross-appeal from the trial judge’s decision and varied the order to dismiss the action against him. First, the trial judge erred in construing s. 86(1) of the MVA, and concluding that Tyson, a front seat passenger, was “operating” the vehicle at the time of the accident. Second, the Court of Appeal held that the consent given by Tyson for Dale to drive did not make Mr. Boltz vicariously liable for the loss caused by Dale’s negligent acts.