Case information

Contracts — Arbitration agreement — Content of agreement — Unconscionability of agreement — Improvidence of bargain — Illegality of bargain — Whether arbitration agreement lacks specificity with respect to procedures and fees — If so, whether agreement unconscionable or contrary to public policy — Whether arbitration agreement subject to imbalance of power or improvidence of bargain — Whether opt-out provisions sufficiently mitigate any imbalance of power or improvidence of bargain — Whether arbitration agreement is contract of adhesion — Whether arbitration agreement fails to specify or explain statutorily protected procedures and remedies — If so, whether arbitration agreement unconscionable or contrary to public policy for attempting to contract out of rights conferred by employment standards legislation.<br>

Case summaries are prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). Please note that summaries are not provided to the Judges of the Court. They are placed on the Court file and website for information purposes only.

Mr. Wasylyk sued Lyft Inc. and Lyft Canada Inc. (collectively, “Lyft”) under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, alleging that he and other Lyft drivers in Ontario are employees, and that Lyft had breached the Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O, 2000, c. 41. Mr. Wasylyk agreed to Lyft’s Terms of Service, including the Arbitration Agreement. Drivers may opt out of the arbitration provisions by contacting its lawyers within 30 days of executing the agreement without losing the other benefits bargained for, including the ability to offer services as a driver. There is no evidence that Mr. Wasylyk opted out of the Arbitration Agreement.

Lyft sought an order under s. 7(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, staying the proposed class action in favour of arbitration. Mr. Wasylyk denied that there was an arbitration agreement but, if it was found that there was one, conceded the other requirements for the existence of an agreement. He argued that his proposed action was suitable for summary judgment, that the arbitration provisions were “inaccessible”, and that the arbitration provisions were unenforceable because the contract was uncertain, unconscionable, contrary to public policy, or unlawfully contracted out of the Employment Standards Act.

The motion judge found that there was no statutory prohibition against submitting worker contracts (whether those of employees or those of dependent contractors) to arbitration. This arbitration agreement was accessible in that it was not a pretense to access to justice, unconscionable or contrary to public policy. It did not contract out of the Employment Standards Act.